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Abstract
The process of the liquidation of the Hetmanate lasted for decades because of its 
scale and the constant need of Russia in the Cossack Army. Empress Elizabeth’s 
regime continued the centralizing policies introduced by Tsar Peter I. In anticipation 
of the possible consequences of this centralization, in the early 1860s Hetman Kyrylo 
Rozumovskyi tried to strengthen local governance by reforming his administrative 
system and judiciary, outlining the justification of his measures in an appeal to Empress 
Catherine II, entitled “Petition of the Little Russian Nobility and Officers, Together with 
the Hetman Concerning the Restoration of Various Old Rights of Little Russia.” At the 
same time, Catherine II’s State Secretary, Grigorii Teplov expressed opposite views to 
the positions expounded in the “Petition,” in his so-called “Notes on Violations in Little 
Russia.” The main theses of Teplov’s memorandum were used by the Empress in secret 
guidelines issued to Petr Rumiantsev in his position as the President of the Second 
Little Russian Collegium. The reasoning of the above-mentioned documents formed 
the basis for Rumiantsev for the liquidation of the Ukrainian state.




The relationship between sovereigns and vassals in the early modern era had a clear-
cut structure. As a rule, it was marked by appropriate agreements. For the Zaporozhian 
Army, from the middle of the 17th century this meant “statutes” with the Muscovite 
state. The latter always sought to restrict the Hetmanate’s independence. This process 
lasted for decades because of Russia’s constant need in utilizing the Cossack army 
to facilitate expansionist politics in the Northern Black and Azov Sea areas. This was 
accomplished by the end of the 18th century through the imperial government’s 
liquidation of the Ukrainian state.
The problem of the collapse of the first Ukrainian state of early-modern times has 
been the subject of scholarly inquiry. In popular historiography the focus has been on 
social questions, in particular, Oleksandr Lazarevskyi and Venedykt Miakotin 1 analyzed 
1 Aleksandr Lazarevskii, Malorossiiskie pospolitye krestiane (1648–1783 gg.) [Little Russian 
Peasants, 1648–1783] (Kyiv, 1908); Venedikt Miakotin, Ocherki sotsialnoi istorii Ukrainy v XVII–
XVIII vv. [Essays on the Social History of Ukraine in the 17th‑18th Centuries], vol. 1, part 3 (Prague: 
Vataha i plamia, 1926).
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the enserfment of the Left-Bank Ukraine peasantry. The transformation of Cossack 
officers into the Russian nobility is described in detail by Dimitrii Miller.2 Heorhii 
Maksymovych 3 studied the role of the president of the Second Little Russian Collegium, 
Petr Rumiantsev, in the political events of that time in Ukraine. The liquidation of the 
Hetmanate was largely ignored by Soviet historians. Only Aleksei Putro has researched 
changes in the socio-economic development and the administrative-military structure 
of Left-Bank Ukraine, as a region of the Russian empire in the second half of the 
18th century.4 The destruction of institutions and social structure of the Hetmanate 
in the imperial system became the subject of research of Canadian historian Zenon 
Kohut.5 Development of the same topics is found in the work of Ukrainian researcher 
Oleksii Strukevych.6 At the same time, clarification of the logic for the justification of 
the centralizing policy of imperial authorities during the liquidation of the Ukrainian 
state in the second half of the 18th century has not been addressed, and is the focus of 
this article.
Imperial Policies Regarding the Hetmanate in 
the Second Half of the 18th Century
The restoration of the Hetmanate in Ukraine in 1750 under the rule of Empress 
Elizabeth (1741–1761) was the result of efforts of Cossack officers who took advantage of 
the morganatic marriage of the Empress with Ukrainian Cossack Oleksii Rozumovskyi. 
However, the freeing of Hetmanate officers from interference by Russian officials in 
Hetmanate administrative affairs was compensated by the presence of Elizabeth’s 
representative at the highest level, tasked with providing effective imperial control 
over Cossack Ukraine.
In the following years, Aleksei Bestuzhev-Riumin, Russian Chancellor and the 
President of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, which was also in charge of Ukraine, 
2 Dimitrii Miller, “Ocherki iz istorii i yuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie 
kazatskoi starshyny v dvorianstvo [Essays on the History and Legal Life of Old Little Russia. 
The Transformation of Cossack Officers Into the Nobility],” Kievskaia starina 1 (1897): 1–31; 
2 (1897): 188–220; 3 (1897): 351–74; 4 (1897): 1–47.
3 Georgii Maksimovich, Deiatelnost Rumiantseva‑Zadunaiskogo po upravleniiu Malorossiei 
[Rumiantsev‑Zadunaiskii’s Activities in the Government of Little Russia], vol. 1 (Nizhyn, 1913).
4 Aleksei Putro, Levoberezhnaia Ukraina v sostave Rossiiskogo gosudarstva vo vtoroi polovine 
XVIII veka [Left‑Bank Ukraine in the Russian State in the Second Half of the 18th Century] (Kyiv: 
Vyshcha shkola, 1988).
5 Zenon Kohut, Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomia. Likvidatsiia Hetmanshchyny 1760–1830 
[Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy. Liquidation of the Hetmanate, 1760–1830] (Kyiv: 
Osnovy, 1996).
6 Oleksii Strukevych, Ukraina-Hetmanshchyna ta Rosiiska imperiia protiahom 50–80kh rr. XVIII 
stolittia (polityko-administratyvnyi aspekt problemy) [The Ukraine‑Hetmanate and the Russian 
Empire During the 1750s and 1780s (Political and Administrative Aspects of the Problem)] (Kyiv: 
Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996).
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took a number of steps towards the elimination of Ukraine’s autonomous structure. 
Given the long absence of Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi from his Hlukhiv residence, 
Bestuzhev-Riumin regularly sent Russian advisers there to coordinate government 
policy. From 1754 the Hetman was forbidden to independently appoint colonels and 
could only nominate candidates for these positions. Two years later, Ukrainian affairs 
were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Senate, which significantly lowered the 
Hetmanate’s political status. Its finances and tax system came under strict Senate 
supervision. Subsequently, Kyiv was also removed from the jurisdiction of the Hetman, 
with the same subordination. The Collegium of Foreign Affairs obliged the Hetmanate 
to report monthly income and expenses. At the same time, Elizabeth’s regime neglected 
the Ukrainian government’s political initiatives, including a request to allow the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with European courts. Thus, under the reign 
of Elizabeth, despite the restoration of the Hetmanate, the Russian imperial course 
continued towards the final elimination of Ukrainian autonomy.
In anticipation of the possible consequences of Russia’s centralizing policies 
towards Ukraine, in the early 1760s Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovskyi attempted to 
strengthen his central and local governments by reforming their administrative systems 
and judiciary. He paid considerable attention to economic problems, including the 
development of trade. However the implementation of many of his projects was slowed 
due to the ascension of Catherine II to the Russian throne in 1762.
Kyrylo Rozumovskyi was forced to leave St. Petersburg a year later and return to 
Ukraine because of conflicts with imperial favorites. Under the influence of Cossack 
officers on the Hlukhiv council, in 1763 he issued a petition to the Empress, entitled 
“The Petition of the Little Russian Nobility and Officers, Together with the Hetman, 
on the Restoration of Various Old Rights of Little Russia.” 7 It presented the vision of 
the Ukrainian elite about the future of the Hetmanate, while demonstrating the level 
of its political culture. In particular, the tradition of the renewal and confirmation of 
contractual articles was emphasized. In essence, the “Petition” contained a proposal 
to legitimize an interstate level of relations between Russia and Ukraine with the 
expansion of the latter’s political autonomy and the implementation of reforms aimed 
at consolidating Ukrainian society.
The mood among Cossack officers was well known to Kyrylo Rozumovskyi’s former 
mentor, Hetman estates manager Grigorii Teplov. He is credited with the authorship of 
a document entitled “Secret Notes on the Current State of Little Russia,” known in the 
literature mainly through its publication by Panteleimon Kulish as “Notes on Disorders 
in Little Russia” in the second volume of his work “Notes on Southern Russia.” 8 A legal 
assessment of the “Secret Notes,” along with the publication of the full text of the 
7 “Proshenie malorossiiskogo shliakhetstva i starshyn, vmeste s hetmanom, o vozstanovlenii 
raznykh starinnykh prav Malorossii, podannoe Ekaterine II v 1764 godu [Petition of the Little 
Russian Gentry and Officers, Together With the Hetman on the Restoration of Various Former 
Rights of Little Russia, Submitted to Catherine II in 1764],” Kievskaia starina 6 (1883): 317–46.
8 Panteleimon Kulish, Zapiski o Yuzhnoi Rusi [Notes on Southern Rus], vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1857).
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document with an introduction and 12 positions, was subsequently made by prominent 
law historian, Mykola Vasylenko.9
In his position as Catherine II’s state secretary, Grigorii Teplov expressed views 
opposite to ideas expressed in the “Petition.” He emphasized the imperial thesis of 
the belonging of “the people of Little Russia” to Russia from old times, supposedly 
confirmed by “Russian and Little Russian chroniclers and many foreign authors”; from 
which it is possible to see that Little Russia belonged to Russia from old times not only 
in territory but also in population.
In the opinion of Teplov, a significant “disorder” in Little Russia was the practice 
of Cossack officers of subordinating not only peasants, but also ordinary Cossacks 
to their authority, which led to a significant reduction in their number. Under such 
circumstances, the military potential of the Hetmanate, which was widely used by the 
Russian Empire in the 18th century for conducting expansionist politics in the Northern 
Black and Azov Sea areas, suffered significant losses.
Grigorii Teplov believed that the obstacle to turning Ukraine into a profitable 
province of the Russian state was the absence of objective information about it. This 
primarily concerned the collection of taxes from peasants. He thus pointed to the 
need for new audits, since after the times of the First Little Russian Collegium Russian 
officers had not participated in them. Teplov’s distrust of the Hetman and the Ukrainian 
administration later turned into the official policy of the empire. Furthermore, 
according to Teplov, the prohibition of the free movement of peasants in Left-Bank 
Ukraine, that is, their actual enserfdom, could bring added profits to the treasury of 
the St. Petersburg court.
Grigorii Teplov was greatly concerned with the existence of traditional legal norms 
in Ukraine, in particular, the Lithuanian Statute, which contradicted the principle of 
autocracy and precluded imperial authorities from using Ukraine’s resources. The official 
noted that Ukrainian law and legal proceedings brought with them only exploitation 
and misunderstanding, bureaucratic red tape, and endless appeals, which were used by 
Cossack officers. Teplov insisted on the necessity to restrict the use of the Lithuanian 
statute because of violations of “human rights and freedoms.” For justification he also 
cited cases of arbitrary decisions of Ukrainian judges against Russians, when the law 
was used “in their favor, but contrary to the Russian owners, as they are considered 
foreigners and aliens in Little Russia.” 10
The main points of Grigorii Teplov’s “Secret Notes” memorandum were fully, 
sometimes exactly as stated, used by Catherine II to carry out imperialist policies in 
Ukraine. Secret instructions to Petr Rumiantsev consisting of 20 points were ample 
evidence of this. They were prepared by State Secretary Adam Olsufiev and edited by the 
Empress herself, upon the appointment of Rumiantsev to the position of President of 
9 Mykola Vasylenko, “G. M. Teplov i yoho ‘Zapiska o neporiadkakh v Malorossii’ [G. M. Teplov and 
His ‘Note on Disorders in Little Russia’],” Zapysky Ukrainskoho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyievi 9 
(1911): 13–54.
10 Mykola Vasylenko, “G. M. Teplov i yoho ‘Zapiska o neporiadkakh v Malorossii,’” 42.
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the Second Little Russian Collegium and concurrently Little Russian Governor-General. 
In justifying the need for imperial unification, Catherine II noted the significant territory 
of the Hetmanate, its high population density, soil fertility, and a favorable climate: “The 
vastness, the multiplicity of the people living in it, its great fertility, and the kindness 
of the climate are different from other lands in the empire.” At the same time, in her 
opinion, these advantages did not provide the Russian state with adequate profits in the 
previous period, “to the contrary, it is well known that Russia, despite all this, has very 
small, and during the last Hetman’s rule, almost no benefit and income.” 11
In the introductory part of the instructions to Count Petr Rumiantsev, Catherine II 
also criticized the interweaving of military and civilian power, the application of the 
Lithuanian statute, and the use of old rights and privileges by Ukrainians, which, in her 
belief, made a mess in the functioning of administrative structures and impeded the 
functioning of the justice system in Ukraine: “There were many ingrained disorders, the 
incongruous mixing of military rule with the civilian; endless red tape, and intimidation 
in trials and by the death penalty.” 12
Catherine II regarded Cossack officers who opposed the imperial census, took 
part in the embezzlement of government revenue, and incited the people “by partisan 
and insidious interpretations” as the main opponent of the imperial government’s 
policies towards Ukraine. As a result, the Empress recognized the “secret hatred” of the 
Ukrainian people of Russians, which was especially evident among the Cossack elite. 
Under these conditions, the governor-general should have made the transformation 
not through force but through more diplomatic means, “showing both a wolf ’s bite 
and a fox’s cunning.” 13 Rumiantsev constantly monitored the behavior of the officers, 
especially those under suspicion, in order to prevent possible threats to the empire. In 
order to strengthen his power and establish his new regime, the governor-general also 
effectively used existing social contradictions in Ukrainian society.
Catherine II tasked Petr Rumiantsev with carrying out administrative reform in 
Ukraine on a Russian model. To this end, a necessary step was the abolition of the office 
of the position of hetman forever. The political assimilation of the Hetmanate had to 
be accomplished by its complete incorporation in the transformation of the Ukrainian 
political and administrative system into the imperial one.
Catherine II’s instructions also included proposals for the replenishment of the 
imperial treasury in the spirit of enlightenment ideology. This involved the statistical 
study of human and natural resources of the region to stimulate economic development, 
and the encouragement of the development of trade, including foreign. Emphasized 
were the need to improve the state of roads, the development of entrepreneurship, 
11 “Nastavleniia, dannye P. Rumiantsevu pri naznachenii ego malorossiiskim gubernatorom s 
sobstvennoruchnymi pravkami Ekateriny II [Instructions Given to Petr Rumiantsev on His 
Appointment as Little Russian Governor with Catherine II’s Handwritten Notes],” in Sbornik 
Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg, 1871), 376–91.
12 “Nastavleniia, dannye P. Rumiantsevu,” 376–91.
13 “Nastavleniia, dannye P. Rumiantsevu,” 382.
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livestock, the introduction of new technical crops, the expansion of forest areas, and 
improvements in the social sphere. Such measures would prove to Ukrainians the 
benefits of imperial rule over the “inferior” government of the previous administration.
Thus the political program of the revival of Ukraine’s autonomy presented in 
the “Petition” caused a sharp reaction in St. Petersburg and became the reason for 
the ultimate liquidation of Ukrainian autonomy by the imperial regime. The logic of 
Grigorii Teplov’s “Secret Notes” was used as the basis for the directives of Governor-
General Petr Rumiantsev. Catherine II’s decree dated November 10, 1764 abolished the 
hetman government and established the Second Little Russian Collegium,14 marking 
the beginning of the dismantling of the Hetmanate.
Arriving in Ukraine in April 1765, Petr Rumiantsev acquainted himself with the 
state of affairs and prepared a memorandum, dated May 18, for Catherine II to clarify 
certain provisions of the reforms. He proposed to organize a police service in every city 
of the Hetmanate, radically reorganize the judicial system, introduce regular postal 
communication, secularize property of the Ukrainian church, pay officials rather than 
grant them land, create a military cadet school, etc.15 Certain of the above positions 
approved by the Empress opened wide opportunities for their implementation by the 
governor-general.
The main prerequisite for increasing revenues to the imperial treasury was a 
census of the population of Ukraine. Its official purpose was to establish a better and 
fairer order. Additionally, Petr Rumiantsev intended to solve many other problems. 
Rumiantsev’s census provided a detailed depiction of the movable and immovable 
property of the region’s inhabitants, their social status, occupations, profits and level 
of taxation, family status, etc. Established in each of the ten regiments, special census 
commissions of local government officials were headed by Russian officers. The census 
in the Hetmanate occurred from 1765 to 1769 and was interrupted by the beginning of 
the Russo-Turkish War.16 It is difficult to talk about its comprehensiveness, as a large 
amount of documentary evidence is not extant. However, on the basis of the collected 
material, the “General Description of Little Russia” was prepared, which provides 
information on more than three and a half thousand settlements. This document also 
became the basis for the beginning of the struggle with peasant transitions in the 
Hetmanate and the appearance in May 1783 of Catherine II’s decree on the enserfment 
of the peasants.
14 “Ukazy i poveleniia imperatritsy Ekateriny II za fevral-dekabr 1764 goda [Empress Catherine II’s 
Decrees and Orders of February-December 1764],” in Senatskii arkhiv, vol. 14 (St. Petersburg: 
Senatskaia tipografiia, 1910), 524–25.
15 “Doklad grafa P. Rumiantseva kasatelno meropriiatii po upravleniiu Malorossieiu 
i sobstvennoruchnye resheniia Ekateriny II [Count P. Rumiantsev’s Report Concerning 
Measures on the Government of Little Russia and Catherine II’s Personal Resolutions],” in 
Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, vol. 10 (St. Petersburg, 1872), 9–21.
16 Dmitrii Bagalei, Generalnaia opis Malorossii [A General Description of Little Russia] (Kyiv, 1883).
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The Little Russian Collegium became the main imperial administrative institution, 
taking over the functions of the General Military Chancellery. The unification of the 
Collegium with corresponding executive bodies of the Russian Empire was completed 
in mid 1768. Individual departments were responsible for military, judicial, and financial 
affairs. A striking example of the unification was the reorganization of the General Military 
Court. By order of the Little Russian Collegium, dated August 1767, it was forbidden to 
hold annual elections to its membership, which in effect meant the liquidation of the 
effective administrative body of the Hetmanate. Instead, the appointment of judges “from 
all local chains” was introduced, respectively, according to their titles. Unlike in previous 
years, the new officials were given annual monetary rewards.17 The reorganization also 
affected the judicial chancellery: two separate expeditions were formed, in criminal 
cases and appeals. Strict prosecutorial supervision was established over them. And in 
the early 1780s, zemsky, grodno, and sub-comorian courts were finally liquidated, legal 
proceedings being instituted on the basis of Russian legislation.18
The idea of a radical administrative reform of the imperial provinces began to be 
effectively implemented after the completion of the Russian-Turkish war in 1774. The 
provincial statute of 1775, the standards of administrative units, and the powers of their 
leaders were supplemented by clarifications of the mechanism for the implementation 
of provincial governance. At the same time, the extension of these provisions to the 
Hetmanate required thorough preparation. To introduce a new administrative system, 
Catherine II appointed an assistant to Petr Rumiantsev, an official from the Cossack 
elite, Andrii Miloradovych, as the second governor-general of Little Russia.19 He created 
a special commission consisting of military officers and Ukrainian officials, which 
carried out a thorough inspection of the Hetmanate and in 1781 submitted a report to 
the Little Russia Collegium. Instead of the traditional regimental-company military 
system of Cossack Ukraine, it proposed to introduce Ukraine’s division into three 
constituencies: Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Novhorod-Siverskyi, each consisting of 11 counties.
Taking into account the autonomist traditions of the Hetmanate, Petr Rumiantsev 
tried to avoid possible conflicts and in a memorandum he offered Catherine II possible 
options for their prevention.20 In particular, he stressed the need to equalize Ukrainian 
and Russian government ranks, to resolve the issue of Cossack rights and privileges, 
among which the most relevant involved Cossack land tenure. To use profits from 
municipalities, the governor-general proposed to ban urban land tenure, which was 
in contradiction of imperial regulations. However, all of Rumiantsev’s proposals were 
17 “Akty po upravleniu Malorossieiu gr. P. A. Rumiantseva [Acts on the Government of Little 
Russia by Count P. A. Rumiantsev],” in Chteniia v istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora letopistsa, 
vol. 5, edited by M. F. Vladimirskii-Budanov (Kyiv, 1891), 93–136.
18 Kohut, Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomia, 181; Vladimir Grigoriev, Reforma mestnogo 
upravleniia pri Ekaterine II [Catherine II’s Reform of Local Government] (St. Petersburg, 1893).
19 Kohut, Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomia, 185.
20 “Doklad grafa P. A. Rumiantseva imperatritse Ekaterine II 1871 goda [Count P. A. Rumiantsev’s 
1781 Report to Empress Catherine II],” Kievskaia starina 12 (1884): 693–703.
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ignored and in January of 1782, administrative reform was put into effect. All Ukrainian 
state institutions were abolished and corresponding imperial ones were established, 
with the transfer of financial affairs to the treasury chambers of the three provinces. 
These transformations did not meet any resistance from Hetmanate officials, for whom 
devotion to imperial service had become commonplace. This was also testimony to the 
absence of, at least at the official level, an attitude of Ukrainians to Russians that could 
be constituted as dangerous for the autocracy.
Along with the administrative reform in the Hetmanate, a reorganization of 
Cossack troops was also carried out, albeit not without difficulty. The President of the 
Little Russian Collegium recommended the creation of 10 regular regiments in which 
experienced Cossack officers would be given appropriate military titles. Catherine II 
agreed with these proposals, in 1778 establishing a military judiciary under the 
jurisdiction of the General Military Court.
The need for Cossack contingents grew due to ambitious imperial plans for the 
seizure of the Northern Black Sea area and Crimea. The deployment of units, the nature 
of the draft, and the location of headquarters were determined in Petr Rumiantsev’s 
numerous instructions in 1783 to Russian general Karl Kaulbars and the governor 
of Little Russia, Andrii Miloradovych. Preference was given to reliable personnel, in 
particular, participants in the last Russo-Turkish war. Officers were recruited only from 
the large pool of existing Cossack officers.21 Instead of Cossack regiments, Carabinier 
regiments were created according to the model of regulars of the imperial army.
The tendency for the incorporation of senior Ukrainian civilian and military strata 
into the imperial political sphere is also evident in the granting to them of official ranks 
according to a rank table.22 Thus former opponents of Russian authority became its 
supporters and the executors of government policies. Some achieved high government 
positions, for example, Oleksandr Bezborodko was appointed Imperial Chancellor, 
and Dmytro Troshchynskyi and Viktor Kochubei became ministers during the reign of 
Alexander I. The majority of the Ukrainian nobility and Cossack officers were equalized 
in rights and privileges with the Russian nobility according to the Сharter to the Gentry 
of 1785.
Conclusion
The logistics of Russian imperial rule in the 18th century relied on thorough 
substantiation, which was inspired by the idea of the inviolability of the principles 
of autocracy. The governing council of Elizabeth’s regime, primarily due to 
21 Kohut, Rosiiskyi tsentralizm i ukrainska avtonomia, 193; Nikolai Storozhenko, “Reformy v 
Malorossii pri gr. Rumiantseve [Reforms in Little Russia Under Count Rumiantsev],” Kievskaia 
starina 3 (1891): 483–92.
22 “Zapiska kasatelno prav na dvorianstvo byvshykh malorossiiskikh chinov [Note on the Equation 
of Noble Status with Former Little Russian Ranks],” in Chteniia Istoricheskogo obshchestva istorii 
i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1861), 88–92.
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Chancellor Aleksei Bestuzhev-Riumin, continued centralizing policies introduced by 
Peter I. Considering the dangers of the imperialist course, in his “Petitions of the Little 
Russian nobility.” Kyrylo Rozumovskyi attempted to reform the Hetmanate in order 
to conserve its status. However, his mentor Grigorii Teplov, having received the title 
of state secretary of Catherine II, in his “Secret Notes on the Current State of Little 
Russia” memorandum to the Empress, prepared an alternative to the autonomist views 
of the Ukrainian elite. This document and instructions given to Petr Rumiantsev in his 
position as the President of the Second Little Russian Collegium formed the basis for 
the elimination of the Ukrainian state of the time.
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